I. INTRODUCTION
In Doggett v. United States, 1 the United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, extended Sixth Amendment speedy trial protection to a defendant unaware of his indictment. Implementing the Barker v. Wingo 2 four-part test for speedy trial claims, Justice Souter's majority opinion held that the "extraordinary" eight-and-a-half year delay between the defendant's indictment and arrest presumptively impaired his defense and therefore violated the Speedy Trial Clause. 3 The Court found that the defendant's inability to prove specific prejudice did not defeat the speedy trial claim. 4 Instead, the majority contended that, whether a defendant has proven prejudice or not, an extraordinary delay between the indictment and trial compromises a trial's reliability, even if in unidentifiable ways. 5 Justice Souter added that in cases involving such an extraordinary delay, mere negligence in prosecution, not bad faith on the government's part, was sufficient to bring a cognizable constitutional claim. ing trial. 8 In a separate dissent, Justice O'Connor criticized the majority for loosening the requirement of proving actual prejudice in favor of presumed prejudice. 9 Justice O'Connor suggested that pretrial delay injures the government just as much, if not more, than the defendant.' 0 This Note examines Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial protection and argues that the Court reasonably extended the right of the "accused" under the Sixth Amendment to an individual unaware of an indictment against him. This Note argues that the Court majority correctly extended the Sixth Amendment to protect against defense impairment caused by long delays. Therefore, defendants unaware of the charges against them can still base a speedy trial claim on the impairment of their defense, regardless of whether liberty infringement has occurred.
This Note further argues that the Court majority properly found that, in cases where lengthy delays occur, the defendant should not have to prove actual prejudice. The Court failed, however, to distinguish between extraordinary delays, which foster presumed prejudice, and shorter delays which do not. Since the Court left no way for the government to rebut presumptive prejudice brought about by extraordinary delays, this Note argues that the distinction is crucial. Furthermore, this Note criticizes the irrebuttable presumption of prejudice the Court has constructed in lengthy delays.
Finally, this Note argues that the Court wisely held the government to a higher prosecutorial due diligence standard. The Court, however, did little to explain what the due diligence standard is or should be. This Note contends that, at the very least, courts should compel prosecutors to take reasonable steps to notify defendants of outstanding charges.
II.
SixTH AMENDMENT SPEEDY TRIAL BACKGROUND
The Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause provides that "in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy... trial."" Since only the "accused" falls under the scope of the Sixth Amendment, the Court has ruled that individuals experiencing prejudicial delay before an official accusation cannot enjoy speedy trial protection.1 2 Therefore, the Court has granted Sixth Amendment protection only to individuals officially accused by arrest or indictment.' 3 Dismissal of the indictment is the exclusive remedy for a speedy trial violation.' 4 The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial does not incorporate precise time limits within which prosecutors, once instituting a criminal prosecution, must complete it. Instead of reading the language strictly to forbid any delays, the Supreme Court has decided that courts should handle defendants' Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial claims by considering the specific facts of each case.' 5 In Barker v. Wingo, 16 the Supreme Court articulated a four-part test for reviewing the facts of each case in determining whether post-accusation delay violates the Speedy Trial Clause. According to Barker, courts must balance: 1) the length of the delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 3) whether the defendant promptly asserted the speedy trial right; and 4) the amount of prejudice suffered.' 7 The Barker court noted that, although each factor was relevant for consideration, it "regard[ed] none of the four factors.., as either a necessary or sufficient condition... [T] hey are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may . 13 See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971) (Sixth Amendment protection triggered by "either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer for a criminal charge").
14 See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 440 (1973) ("in light of the policies which underlie the right to a speedy trial, dismissal must remain the only possible rem-be relevant." 18 Due to the imprecision of the constitutional standard for speedy trial claims, Congress enacted the Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974 which dictates specific time limits for completing the key stages of a federal criminal prosecution.' 9 The Speedy Trial Act requires a trial to begin no more than seventy days from the filing of the information or indictment, or from the date the defendant appears before an officer of the court in which the charge is pending, whichever is later. 20 In addition to the Speedy Trial Act, state statutes and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure contain speedy trial provisions to prevent post-accusation delays.
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Nevertheless, the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment has remained an important, yet imprecise, measure of protection for defendants prejudiced by post-accusation delay. In the meantime, after returning to the United States, Doggett led a normal, productive and law-abiding life. 4 5 He met his wife in October 1982 and married her a year later. 46 Doggett interacted openly and freely in the community using his real name and made no attempt to conceal his identity or whereabouts. 4 7 He financed two homes through the bank, possessed credit cards, registered to vote, filed income tax returns, obtained a driver's license, received three traffic tickets, earned his associate degree at college and worked as a computer operations manager. 48 Doggett remained lost to the American criminal justice system until September 1988, when he underwent a credit check pursuant to a Marshal's office program that checks outstanding warrants. 4 9 Within thirty minutes, the government discovered Doggett's driver's license number, the make and tag of his car, his wife's name, his employer and his address. 50 On September 5, 1988, nearly six years after his return to the United States and eight-and-a-half years after his indictment, the government arrested Doggett on charges of conspiring to import and distribute cocaine. 5 1 Doggett moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the government's failure to prosecute him earlier violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. 5 2 On December 27, 1988, the magistrate entered a Report and Recommendation suggesting the denial of Doggett's motion to dismiss. 53 Relying on Barker, the mag- 41 Doggett v. United States, 906 F.2d 573, 576 (11 th Cir. 1990 ). 42 Id. at 576-77. 43 istrate found that the delay between Doggett's indictment and arrest was long enough to be "presumptively prejudicial," and the delay "clearly [was] attributable to the negligence of the government." 54 The magistrate also found that Doggett had appropriately asserted his right to a speedy trial since no evidence existed that he had known of the charges against him until his arrest. 5 5 The magistrate further found, however, that Doggett made no affirmative showing that the delay impaired his ability to mount a successful defense or had otherwise prejudiced him. 56 In his recommendation to the district court, the magistrate contended that the failure to demonstrate particular prejudice sufficed to defeat Doggett's speedy trial claim. 5 7 On January 31, 1989, the district court entered an order denying Doggett's motion to dismiss the speedy trial claim, accepting the magistrate's Report and Recommendation. 58 On February 3, 1989, Doggett entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (a) (2), expressly reserving the right to appeal his ensuing conviction on the speedy trial claim. 5 9 At sentencing on March 31, 1989, a trial court found Doggett guilty of a felony, sentencing him to three years probation and a one thousand dollar fine. 60 Doggett appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. 6 1 A split panel of the court of appeals affirmed the conviction. 6 2 Relying on Ringstaff v. Howard, 6 3 the appellate court ruled that, absent bad faith by the government, Doggett could prevail only by proving "actual prejudice" or by establishing that "the first three Barker factors weighed heavily in his favor." '6 4 Applying this standard, the Eleventh Circuit majority agreed with the magistrate that Doggett had not shown actual prejudice. Attributing the government's delay to "negligence" rather than "bad faith," 6 6 the court concluded that Barker's first three factors did not weigh so heavily against the government so as to make proof of 54 In considering the first Barker factor, an uncommonly lengthy delay, the majority easily found that the eight-and-a-half year delay "was not customarily prompt. ' ' 7 ' The majority presumed that prejudice intensifies over time and found that Doggett's delay stretched beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim. 74 While the majority did not believe the government acted in bad faith, Justice Souter noted that the government's actions were "findable negligence," which weighed against its prosecution.
III. FACTUAL AND
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Justice Souter also briefly touched upon the third Barker factor, assertion of the speedy trial claim. Although the government maintained that Doggett had not promptly sought his Sixth Amendment claim, 7 6 the majority refused to punish Doggett for not invoking his speedy trial right until after his arrest. 7 7 The majority noted that if Doggett had known of the charges, this knowledge would have weighed heavily against Doggett. Doggett, however, was unaware of the indictment.
78
Justice Souter then addressed the government's principal contention. The government presented two arguments implicating the fourth Barker factor, amount of prejudice suffered. 79 First, attempting to limit Barker, the government contended that, outside the protection of liberty interests, the Speedy Trial Clause was not generally intended to protect a criminal defendant's fair trial. 8 0 Consequently, according to the government, Doggett was not really an "accused;" therefore, the Sixth Amendment did not protect him against having his defense impaired by the government. 8 1 The majority refused to honor this argument, which would indicate a statistical probability of prejudice; it simply marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker enquiry."). Under the Sixth Amendment, the majority contended, the speedy trial inquiry must weigh the effects of delay on the accused's defense, just as it has to weigh any other form of prejudice that Barker recognized. 4 The second argument raised by the government was that Doggett had not shown how the delay prejudiced him. 8 5 Justice Souter agreed with the prosecution that Doggett's prejudice could only arise from the possibility that his defense was impaired; he was neither subjected to pretrial detention nor aware of the charges, an awareness which could have potentially caused anxiety or humiliation.
6
The majority, however, disagreed with the government's contention that Doggett had to show exactly how the delay weakened his defense. Although the majority conceded that Doggett had come up short in this respect, Justice Souter noted that "consideration of prejudice is not limited to the specifically demonstrable."
Justice Souter explained that since prejudice is difficult to prove, it is not essential for defendants to show prejudice in every speedy trial claim as long as the defendant experienced lengthy delays. 88 While the Court would not go so far as to state that presumptive prejudice by a long delay carried a Sixth Amendment claim, Justice Souter noted that mixing other relevant facts with an extensive delay increases the likelihood of a successful claim. 8 9 Excessive delay, the Court reasoned, compromises the reliability of a trial in ways a defendant cannot prove. 90 Next, Justice Souter considered how large a role the presumptive prejudice stemming from Doggett's eight-year delay could play vances no satisfactory reason for the delay and the defendant experiences actual prejudice from the delay).
82 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2692. 83 ME at 2692 n.2 ("We reject the government's argument that the effect of delay on adjudicative accuracy is exclusively a matter for consideration under the Due Process Clause.").
84 Id. at 2692. These other forms of prejudice recognized by Barker were pretrial incarceration and the anxiety and humiliation of awaiting trial after posting bond. See Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377-78 (1969 
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in his speedy trial claim. 9 1 The court looked at three hypothetical cases. In the first case, where the government pursued Doggett with reasonable diligence, the majority suggested Doggett's claim would fail absent specific prejudice. 92 In this hypothetical, the majority assumed the pretrial delay was excusable and justified. In the second hypothetical, in which the government caused the delay in bad faith, the majority said that Doggett would surely prevail, especially with an extensive delay.
93
The Court's third hypothetical mirrored Doggett's case, in which prosecutorial negligence caused the delay in bringing the accused to trial. 94 In this case, the majority suggested balancing the Barker factors according to the facts. 9 5 Although noting that negligence certainly weighed less heavily against the government than deliberate bad faith, the majority said, "[I]t still falls on the wrong side of the divide between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for delaying a criminal prosecution once it has begun." 96 Due to the presumption that negligent behavior compounds prejudice over time, the majority further presumed that evidentiary prejudice grows .97
In effect, the majority ruled that negligence compounds with time, even if the accused cannot prove that prejudice exists. Though the Court hinted that the government could "persuasively rebut 98 Doggett's contentions, it did not dictate how the government could have done so. In fact, the Court merely noted, "[w]hile the Government ably counters Doggett's efforts to demonstrate particularized trial prejudice, it has not, and probably could not have, affirmatively proved that the delay left his ability to defend himself unimpaired." 99 In a final policy argument, the majority noted that it was not willing to punish Doggett for the prosecutor's mistakes and allow the government to "gamble with the interests of criminal suspects assigned a low prosecutorial priority."' 10 0 Instead, the Court dismissed Doggett's indictment due to the combination of the government's negligence in causing the extraordinary delay and the In addition, Justice O'Connor suggested that delay is a "double-edged sword," which would hurt the government's prosecution just as much as Doggett's defense. 1 0 5 She reasoned that since the government had the burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt, it was even more adversely affected by the delay than Doggett. protect against prejudice to the defendant's defense."1 0 Justice Thomas did not accept the majority's assertion that "precedent supports" the fact that the Sixth Amendment protects against defense prejudice.' Thomas stated that the Speedy Trial Clause is not directed against delay-related prejudice generally but against delayrelated prejudice to a defendant's liberty.112 Justice Thomas said that "inordinate delay ... may impair a defendant's ability to present an effective defense. But the major evils protected against by the speedy trial guarantee exist quite apart from actual or possible prejudice to an accused's defense."" 5 Justice Thomas stressed that the key in analyzing Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial claims has always been to consider prejudice to an individual's liberty."t 4 He argued that any precedential language suggesting that defendants need not prove actual prejudice in speedy trial claims existed because the Court had never foreseen a case in which such a large delay could occur with the defendant not suffering any impairment of liberty. 1 5 Justice Thomas suggested that if the Speedy Trial Clause was aimed at safeguarding against prejudice to the defense, then it would presumably limit all prosecutions that occur long after the crime. 1 6 According to Justice Thomas, defendants prosecuted years after a crime are just as hampered in defending themselves whether they "were indicted the week after the crime or the week before the trial."11 7 Therefore, "It]he initiation of a formal criminal prosecution is simply irrelevant to whether the defense has been prejudiced by delay."" 8 Justice Thomas believed Doggett was not an "accused" under Second, Justice Thomas discounted any entitlement to relief under the Speedy Trial Clause due to the disruption of Doggett's life, an issue which he criticized the majority for not even addressing. 12 1 Thomas said the Sixth Amendment does not protect a right of repose, a right to remain free from secret or unknown indictments which could later disrupt his new law-abiding life. 12 2
After looking at common law repugnance to a criminal right to repose, Justice Thomas again noted that an individual unaware of an indictment should seek relief under federal and state statutes of limitations: "Such statutes not only protect a defendant from prejudice to his defense . . . but also balance his interest in repose against society's interest in the apprehension and punishment of criminals."' 123 Justice Thomas wrote that "to recognize a constitutional right to repose is to recognize a right to be tried speedily after the offense," converting the Speedy Trial Clause into a constitutional statute of limitations.
124
Justice Thomas' dissent outlined his fear that, in becoming so The Doggett majority correctly granted relief under the Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause. The Court extended the definition of "accused" under the Amendment at least to defendants unaware of their indictments. In doing so, the Court properly realized Doggett's potential defense impairment after an eight-and-a-half year delay, which occurred largely due to government negligence. The Court, however, did not note whether their decision affects the due process requirements of actual prejudice in the pre-indictment stage. Extending the Speedy Trial Clause, and therefore the Barker test, to the pre-indictment stage of the criminal process would seem reasonable since defense impairment occurs during delays at all stages in the prosecution. , J., dissenting) . 127 Id. at 2700 n.5 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 128 Thomas noted that the delay between the indictment and trial probably even helped Doggett as evidenced by his sentence of only a $1000 fine and three years probation. Id. at 2701 n.6 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[T]he delay gave Doggett the opportunity to prove what most defendants can only promise: that he no longer posed a threat to society. There can be little doubt that, had he been tried immediately after his cocaine-importation activities, he would have received a harsher sentence.").
129 Id. at 2700-01 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
The Barker balancing test, upheld by the court, provides a helpful, ad-hoc basis for lower courts to analyze the respective factors crucial in determining whether a speedy trial violation has occurred. The Court's application of the Barker test to lengthy delays such as in Doggett, however, has some flaws. First, the Court failed to specify what constitutes an "extraordinary" delay, which allows a defendant to allege presumptive prejudice. Similarly, the Court did not discuss how the government in cases of extraordinary delay could rebut the presumption of prejudice. By not suggesting a standard by which the government could rebut a defendant's presumptive prejudice, the Court seemingly imposed an irrebuttable presumption of prejudice for lengthy delays caused in any part by the prosecution.
The Court also appropriately ruled that, where the government fails to use diligence in apprehending a defendant, the delay weighs against the prosecution. The Court, however, failed to specify this minimum level of prosecutorial due diligence. This Note argues that the Court should have imposed on the government an obligation to notify the defendant of the charges. Then, by failing to exercise reasonable efforts to notify the defendant, courts could hold the prosecution to a higher standard without indulging in an ad-hoc grading of prosecutors' efforts.
A.
WAS DOGGETr AN "ACCUSED"?
The Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause protects the "accused" from long delays in prosecution. 3 0 Historically, an individual not subject to arrest or indictment cannot enjoy Sixth Amendment protection.' 3 1 Before arrest or indictment, the Court interprets the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, along with state and federal statutes of limitations, to protect defendants against prejudice stemming from long delays between a crime and formal accusation. under the Sixth Amendment speedy trial four-part balancing test laid out in Barker. An individual not deemed accused, however, must rely on the Due Process Clause. 13 3 The Court has required defendants relying on the Due Process Clause to present concrete evidence showing material harm and prosecutorial bad intent, instead of merely engaging in the balancing test. 134 "Accused" individuals, therefore, have a lower burden of proving that harm occurred due to the prosecution's delay.
The majority and dissent in Doggett disagreed whether Doggett was in fact an "accused" entitled to relief under the Sixth Amendment. Justice Thomas noted in his dissent that an accused typically suffers liberty infringement as a result of the delay.' 3 5 Doggett, however, did not endure pretrial incarceration, nor did he suffer humiliation and anxiety while awaiting trial, prejudices normally protected against under the Sixth Amendment. Instead, for much of the period after the indictment, Doggett lived a normal life in Virginia, unaware of the charges. 1 3 6 Since the delay did not explicitly inconvenience Doggett, Justice Thomas' dissent argued that Doggett did not merit Sixth Amendment protection.
Although Doggett did not suffer actual harm to his liberty, the majority correctly protected against Doggett's probable defense impairment due to the delay. The Court did so by holding that the government's filing of the indictment initiated Doggett's Sixth Amendment protection as an accused, regardless of his knowledge of the charges.' 3 7 The Court stated that once receiving the indictment, passage of time impaired Doggett's defense. 13 8 Therefore, once the prosecution files an indictment, courts should continue to hold the government responsible for diligently arresting defendants and granting expeditious trials. 139 Justice Thomas' dissent, however, argued that the indicted individual who has not suffered liberty infringement cannot enjoy Sixth 133 U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV. i34 See, e.g., Marion, 404 U.S. at 324 (allowing for dismissal under the Due Process Clause "if it were shown at trial that the pre-indictment delay in this case caused substantial prejudice to the defendant's rights to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device of government to gain advantage over the accused"); Acha v. United States, 910 F.2d 28, 32 (Ist Cir. 1990 The Court has long recognized defense impairment as "the most serious" protection of the Sixth Amendment since it "skews the fairness" of the trial.1 43 Memory lapses and the loss of both witnesses and evidence, which all damage a defendant's defense, occur with delay, whether or not the defendant is aware of the indictment.
44
Since defense impairment compounds with time after the crime regardless of when or whether an indictment is filed, Justice Thomas failed to see why indicting an individual allows the person to be "accused" if the person did not suffer liberty infringement. 45 Justice Thomas reasoned that prejudice due to defense impairment grows with time after a crime regardless of when or whether the government files an indictment. 46 Under Justice Thomas' reasoning, however, defense impairment does not merit Sixth Amendment protection. According to Justice Thomas, Doggett could not enjoy Sixth Amendment protection since he was ignorant of the indicted charges and not "ac- The Court majority correctly interpreted the definition of an accused to protect an indicted defendant unaware of the accusation and solely concerned about defense impairment. Allowing protection for defense impairment, however, threatens to tear apart the Court's distinction between pre-and post-indictment delay and its subsequent reliance on separate constitutional amendments. Defense impairment, after all, really exists at any time after the criminal act regardless whether or not an indictment has been filed.' 5 0 An inherent discrepancy exists in granting Doggett Sixth Amendment protection merely by being indicted without realizing it.
The Court likely only intended to extend speedy trial protection to defendants unaware of pending charges. Once the Court stresses defense impairment by granting Sixth Amendment protection to someone unaware of charges, however, it is uncertain why courts should deny this important protection to others concerned about having his or her defense impaired.' 5 ' 147 Id. at 2700 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[S]peedy trial guarantee cannot be violated ... when an accused is entirely unaware of a pending indictment."). 148 
B. THE PREJUDICE FACTOR
The fourth Barker factor in analyzing a speedy trial claim considers the amount of prejudice placed on the defendant due to the delay in the proceedings. 1 54 Although the Supreme Court, prior to Doggett, had stated that an affirmative demonstration of prejudice to a defense was not a prerequisite to affording speedy trial relief, 15 5 it was occasioned."); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE, supra note 14, § 12-2.2(a) ("Indeed, if the uncharged defendant is compared with a defendant who knows he or she is charged but is not brought to trial promptly thereafter, the former may be at an even greater disadvantage because the defendant is not prompted to prepare his or her defense.").
152 The notion that pre-indicted defendants have speedy trial interests has received some acknowledgement from the Court. See Marion, 404 U.S. at 328 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The right to a speedy trial is the right to be brought to trial speedily which would seem to be as relevant to pre-indictment delays as it is to post-indictment delays"); See also United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 318 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("We have ... recognized that one may stand publicly accused without being under indictment."). However, pre-and post-accusation delay remain protected under two different balancing tests and two different constitutional amendments. Short of a complete overhaul of the existing speedy trial guarantees, it is more likely the Doggett decision will remain limited to protecting defendants unaware of pending indictments from defense impairment. At least one circuit court has recently noticed the tightrope the Supreme Court is drawing in trying to distinguish pre-and post-indictment defense impairment protection. Believing a showing of prejudice was necessary to pursue his speedy trial claim, Doggett attempted to prove that several events occurred during the long delay which prejudiced his trial.' 57 The defense noted that seventeen tape-recorded conversations, a government informant and a material witness-all relevant to Doggett's prosecution-had disappeared.1 58 The defense summed up the prejudice by alleging, "Doggett's delayed arrest completely disrupted his life, drained his financial resources, interfered with his liberty and may well have actually interfered with his ability to present a defense." 1 5 9
To rebut these arguments by the defense, the government alleged that Doggett's prejudice claims were purely speculative.' 60 The government suggested that the tape recordings, made in the course of the government's undercover investigation, would most likely have confirmed Doggett's guilt. 16 ' The government further noted that Doggett's presumed prejudice due to the long delay should receive little merit.' 62 The Doggett majority never mentioned the missing tapes or witnesses, but instead noted that "consideration of prejudice is not limited to the specifically demonstrable."' 16 3 The Court decided that because an extraordinary delay occurred due to government negligence, a presumption of prejudice existed.' 64 Doggett, therefore, did not have to prove prejudice. Although lower courts, prior to Doggett, had not assumed defendants suffered prejudice due to delays, ' 65 the majority in Doggett found that, in an "extraordinary" de-lay, this presumptive prejudice exists. 1 66 Although the majority assumed Doggett's prejudice, it did not contradict precedent. The Barker Court noted that prejudice caused by defense impairment is the most difficult type of prejudice to prove because time erodes evidence and testimony. 16 7 Therefore, the Doggett Court reasoned that, in an eight-and-a-half year delay, prejudice surely exists, even if defendants cannot prove its existence. 168 In her separate dissent, Justice O'Connor criticized the majority's reliance on presumptive prejudice. Justice O'Connor suggested that the delay prejudiced the government more than Doggett since the government would have a much more difficult time proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt. 16 9 Similarly, Justice Thomas' dissent noted that the delay undoubtedly helped Doggett by reducing his sentence.' It is monstrous to put a man on his trial after such a lapse of time. How can he account for conduct so far back? If you accuse a man of a crime the next day, he may be enabled to bring forward his servant and family to say where he was and what he was about at the time; but if the charge be not preferred for a year or more, how can he clear himself? No man's life would be safe if such a prosecution were permitted. It would be very unjust to put him on his trial. 169 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2694 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also Barker, 407 U.S. at 521 (noting that the Court has long noted that speedy trial claims are especially confusing since "pre-trial delay, the danger against which the right is designed to protect, often works to the advantage of a criminal defendant, particularly one who is not confined while awaiting trial."); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 326 (C.K. Ogden ed., 1931) (" [i] t is desirable that punishment should follow offense as closely as possible; for its impression upon the minds of men is weakened by distance, and, besides, distance adds to the uncertainty of punishment, by affording new chances of escape.").
170 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2701 n.6 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Although both dissents may have correctly assumed that delay could have also prejudiced the government, they cannot refute that the Bill of Rights protects individuals instead of the government.'
7 '
The Sixth Amendment should not protect the government from delays caused by poor prosecution techniques or from losing exculpatory evidence; instead, it should protect defendants from prejudice arising from these delays. 1 72 Therefore, the dissent fails to note that Doggett may have received an undeserving conviction altogether.
Lack of Standard for Determining Extraordinary Delays
The Court correctly inferred presumptive prejudice due to Doggett's extraordinary delay caused by government negligence.1 7 3
The Court failed, however, to distinguish between "extraordinary" delays that foster this presumed prejudice and regular delays that do not. 174 The majority merely noted that, when performing the Barker test, the longer the delay, the greater the presumption of prejudice.
175
Whether or not an extraordinary delay exists, however, greatly affects which party has the burden of showing the existence of prejudice.' 76 When no extraordinary delay exists, courts will not presume prejudice, 77 so that the defendant still has the burden of 172 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 13, § 2.8(e) (constitutional guarantee paramount regardless of the practical costs or efficiency of the criminal process).
173 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2693 (suggesting that court's toleration of government negligence should vary "inversely with its protractedness.").
174 The Court only mentions that the delay is "extraordinary." Id. at 2694; See also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972) (five-year delay "extraordinary").
'75 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2693 ("[T]he weight we assign to official negligence compounds over time as the presumption of evidentiary prejudice grows."). The majority likely did not mention any specific time frame for fear that the time limit would begin to appear like the constitutional statute of limitations, which the dissent accused the majority of installing instead of the Barker balancing test.
176 Commentators have noted that the party holding the burden of proving prejudice may dictate the result of the case. See generally Survey, Right To a Speedy Trial, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REv. 164, 170-71 (1972) (the party with the burden rarely prevails because it is so difficult to establish actual prejudice).
177 For example, in a post-Doggett case, the Second Circuit dismissed a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim after the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice from the seven-month delay between the indictment and trial. Though the court acknowledged the Doggett Court's determination that failure to show prejudice is not necessarily fatal to a speedy trial inquiry, the court distinguished the case since the delay was only seven months and not due to government negligence, so much as the complexity of the case. Aug. 3, 1992) .
The Doggett majority, in finding prejudice, did perhaps skirt one of the major issues, establishing prejudice.
8
On the other hand, in an extraordinary delay, a presumption of prejudice automatically exists due to the length of the delay.' 7 9 Instead of making the defendant prove actual harm, the government has the burden of rebutting a presumption of prejudice. 1 8 0 Thus, whether the delay is extraordinary is crucial in affecting the burden of proof. The Court, though, failed to specify a means of determining when a delay is extraordinary. 18 1 To protect itself from criticism and give guidance to lower courts, the Court should have installed the applicable statute of limitations as the time frame where courts can imply presumptive prejudice after the indictment is filed. 182 The Court has already noted that "these statutes provide predictability by specifying a limit beyond which there is an irrebuttable presumption that a defendant's right to a fair trial would be prejudiced."' ' 8 3 Since statutes of limitations are fostered to "minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past," their time limits should apply to accused defendants similarly prejudiced by poor prosecution. 8 
Failure to Define Rebuttable Presumption of Prejudice
In addition to its failure to establish the length of an extraordinary delay, which shifts the burden of proving a constitutional violation, the Doggett majority also failed to explain how the government could have rebutted Doggett's presumptive prejudice. Justice Souter's opinion indicated that the government had not persuasively rebutted Doggett's prejudice, but it did not state how the government could have rebutted this unsubstantiated prejudice. 1 8 6 In fact, the Court suggested that the government probably could not have done so.' 8 7 Under the Court's nebulous reasoning, a delay that fosters presumed prejudice appears irrebuttable.
In an "extraordinary" delay, therefore, the government apparently cannot rebut presumptive prejudice.' 8 8 For example, in a post-Doggett case, the Ninth Circuit held that a six-year delay violated the Speedy Trial Clause even though the defendant conceded that most of the essential witnesses and documentary evidence were still available. 1 8 9 The Ninth Circuit, while quoting from Doggett that the government can "persuasively rebut" the presumption of prejudice, merely noted that the government had not done so in this case.' 90 Therefore, once a court has found an "extraordinary" delay, the prosecution cannot rebut presumptive prejudice and loses.
The Doggett majority correctly found that a long delay is apt to impair an individual's defense. At the very least, however, the Court needs to distinguish between extraordinary delays and other delays. In addition, where an extraordinary delay exists, the Court should enunciate what the government must show in order to rebut prejudice. In the absence of such a standard, extraordinary delay becomes an irrebuttable presumption of prejudice.
C. PROSECUTORIAL IMPLICATIONS
Under the second Barker prong, courts must consider the prosecutor's and defendant's respective reasons for the delay in the proceedings. 1 9 '
Since an "extraordinary" delay presumptively prejudices defendants, the Doggett decision places a heightened burden on the prosecution to limit post-indictment delay. The Court, however, did not properly specify these prosecutorial duties of diligence.' 92 The majority described the diligence duty only by stating that the DEA "made no serious effort" to determine if Doggett had returned to the United States.' 9 3 This "findable negligence," coupled with the lengthy delay, tipped the Barker balancing test in Doggett's favor. 194 After Doggett, the impact of diligence and negligence by the prosecution remains uncertain. The Court has previously stated that the government has a constitutional duty to make a diligent good-faith effort to bring indicted defendants to trial without unnecessary delay.' 9 5 Following United States v. Loud Hawk,' 9 6 lower courts limited this requirement, ruling that, absent bad faith, the government is not largely accountable for delays due to gathering materials for trial,' 9 7 limited prosecutorial resources' 9 8 and crowded court dockets.1 9 9 In addition, courts have found that defendants similarly possess a duty to limit pretrial delays. Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly stated so, lower courts often hold that missing defendants have waived their rights to a speedy trial. 20 0 Some lower courts, however, have recently placed a higher burden on the government in its effort to locate and apprehend missing defendants. 20 ' Courts, though, have never held law enforcement officials to "heroic efforts" in apprehending defendants purposefully avoiding apprehension or fleeing to unknown parts.
2
Doggett presented a different scenario-a missing defendant who was not fleeing prosecution. The Court correctly held the prosecution in this case to a higher standard to apprehend Doggett. 20 3 If the government actively pursues a missing defendant, thus meeting the higher standard, the ensuing delay should not run as part of a defendant's speedy trial claim. 20 4 If, however, the prosecution does not actively seek the defendant, the delay should serve as part of a defendant's speedy trial claim. Therefore, prosecutors must actively seek out all defendants whom they have indicted.
5
The dissent, however, would not compel prosecutors to actively seek out people unaware of their indictments. 20 6 Thus, under the dissent's formulation, the government has no incentive to quickly arrest individuals unaware of charges. The prosecution could indict individuals sporadically, prosecuting at will, regardless of any consequences from time delay. Therefore, so long as the government indicted a person within the applicable statute of limitations, the dissent seemingly would uphold the conviction of the defendant unaware of an indictment many years later. On the contrary, courts should require the prosecution to diligently seek defendants under protections granted by the Sixth Amendment.
7
Doggett, which holds prosecutors to higher standards, may continue to shift the burden on the prosecution to limit delays after filing an indictment. For example, in United States v. Shell, a postDoggett case, the Ninth Circuit held the prosecution negligent, even though the defendant had earlier fled to another country under an alias. 2 08 The court found that the government misplaced the defendant's files for five years after locating him. 20 9 This holding mirrored Justice Souter's assertion in Doggett that merely because a defendant is a low priority does not mean his or her Sixth Amendment protection lessens.
10
On the same day the Court decided Doggett, it also granted certiorari and remanded Aguirre v. United States, another Sixth Amendment speedy trial case. 2 1 ' This decision may further define the Court's prosecutorial due diligence expectations. In Aguirre, the Ninth Circuit found a five-year delay between indictment and trial presumptively prejudicial but excusable since the delay resulted from the government's inability through diligent efforts to locate the defendant. 2 1 2 Therefore, the court ruled against the defendant's speedy trial claim.
The Supreme Court, however, remanded the case in light of the Doggett decision. 2 1 3 The Court likely believed that the prosecution in Aguirre did not actively seek the defendant. 21 4 After the government issued the indictment, they failed to contact Aguirre's family or lawyer. 2 1 5 The government only placed "stops" in various computer systems and then forgot about the matter for five years.
16
Like Doggett, Aguirre returned to the United States and lived openly, never assuming a false identity. 2 1 7 Aguirre held several jobs, including one with the state's department of revenue where he was fingerprinted, licensed and cleared for security.
18
The Aguirre case, therefore, presents another fact pattern to help decipher government prosecutorial duties. However, the diligence standard that the Court intends the lower courts to follow under the second Barker prong is still unclear. The Supreme Court obviously wants to give courts discretion to use the Barker balancing test, yet balancing inherently places the courts in a position of ad 210 Doggett, 112 S. Ct. at 2693 ("Condoning prolonged and unjustifiable delays in prosecution would both penalize many defendants for the state's fault and simply encourage the government to gamble with the interests of criminal suspects assigned a low prosecutorial priority."). [Vol. 83hoc second-guessing prosecutors' actions. 21 9 In light of the confusing standards, the Court should have instituted a notice requirement on the prosecution under the second prong of the Barker test. This notice requirement would help clarify which party is accountable for different periods of pretrial but postindictment delay. 2 20 In the absence of a reasonable attempt to notify the defendant, the reason for the delay would weigh heavily against the prosecution. 22 1 The prosecution should incur punishment for not allowing defendants the opportunity to compile a defense at the most beneficial time, especially since it is so easy to take reasonable steps to notify the defendant. 2 22 Once the defendant receives notice, however, he or she then holds the burden of reducing the trial delay. If, after notice, the defendant evades arrest, any later actions should weigh heavily against the speedy trial claim.
223
A notice requirement also could explain clearly the government's prosecutorial faults in the Supreme Court's cases. In Doggett, for example, the prosecution failed to exercise reasonable diligence 221 Some factors which would show reasonable attempts to notify include: 1) periodic attempts to locate defendant at last known place of residence and employment, 2) periodic interviews with defendant's friends and family, 3) periodic requests for foreign assistance, 4) periodic placement of defendant's name on various crime computers and 5) periodic reviews of defendant's telephone and employment records. The Constitutional requirement of a trial requires that a defendant be served with a warrant of arrest within a reasonable time after the filing of the complaint. Thereby he would be given notice of the fact that a charge has been made against him at a time when witnesses in his behalf, if any there be, are available.
Id.
223 In these cases, the defendant could be said to have "implied notice" whereby the speedy trial right has most likely been waived. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
in notifying Doggett of the indictment. 224 The DEA waited twentysix days after filing the indictment to arrest him at his parent's home. 2 25 Second, even when the DEA knew Doggett was in jail in Panama, the DEA failed to notify him of the indictment. 22 6 Finally, the government failed for six years to perform a cursory check to ascertain whether Doggett had returned to the United States, a check which would have led immediately to Doggett's discovery. 22 7 Similarly, in Aguirre, the prosecution failed to take reasonable steps to notify the defendant of the pending indictment. Although Aguirre was in contact with the American Embassy in London, he was not made aware of the indictment. 228 In addition, the prosecution failed to notify either Aguirre's family or lawyer. 2 29 Finally, the government, once again, did not attempt to check if he had returned to the United States. A notice requirement would also satisfy the policy arguments raised by both the Doggett majority and dissent. On one hand, the notice requirement would satisfy the Court's desire to encourage prosecutors to actively seek out defendants. 23 ' Courts would also hold prosecutors to similar standards for all defendants, so that no defendant would engender less Sixth Amendment protection.
On the other hand, notice requirements would not "transform the courts into boards of law-enforcement supervision," thus satisfying the dissent's policy concern. 2 3 2 The courts would simply assess whether prosecutors had reasonably attempted notice. Little need would exist for the court to second-guess any of the prosecution's other actions. Once the government met this standard, courts would not find negligence under the second Barker prong.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Doggett majority correctly granted relief under the Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause because of the defense impairment caused by delays. In doing so, the Court extended the definition of "accused" under the Amendment, at least to defendants unaware of charges against them. The Court, however, did not mention whether their decision affects the due process requirements of actual prejudice in the pre-indictment stage. Extending the Speedy Trial Clause, and therefore the Barker test, to the preindictment stage of the criminal process would seem reasonable since defense impairment due to delay occurs at all stages of the prosecution.
The Barker balancing test, upheld by the Court, provides a helpful ad-hoc basis for lower courts to analyze crucial factors in deciding whether a speedy trial violation has occurred. The Court's application of the Barker test to lengthy delays in Doggett, however, has some flaws. First, the Court did not distinguish between extraordinary and normal delays. Since the Court stated that extraordinary delays contain a built-in presumption of prejudice which the prosecution apparently cannot rebut, this distinction is crucial. In failing to mention how the prosecution could rebut prejudice caused by extraordinary delays, the Court has unnecessarily implemented an irrebuttable presumption of prejudice for long delays caused in any part by the prosecution.
Although the Court mentioned that prosecutors must follow a higher standard in bringing missing defendants to trial, the Court did not specify this due diligence standard. The Court should have compelled prosecutors to take reasonable steps to notify defendants of outstanding charges. In this way, defendants would maintain their constitutional right to a speedy trial without placing the courts in the position of second-guessing a prosecutor's performance.
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